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Global welfare and trade-related regulations of GM food:  
Biosafety, markets and politics 
 
By Guillaume P. Gruère 
 
Abstract 
This paper presents an overview of current and upcoming trade related regulations of genetically modified 
(GM)  food,  and  analyzes  their  effects  on  trade,  consumers,  and  producers.  Using  a  three  country 
analytical model of welfare and political interests, the study assesses the economic effects and motivation 
behind  the  adoption  of  import  approval  regulations,  information  requirements  for  GM  commodity 
shipments, and GM food marketing policies. The results of the analysis show that in a non-GM producing 
country,  trade-related  regulations  will  benefit  producers,  but  not  necessarily  consumers.  Thus,  while 
consumers may play a role in supporting import approval regulations, producers’ support is likely to be 
instrumental to the adoption of all other types of regulations. Outside pressure groups will play the role of 
swing voters in cases where consumers and producers do not agree, such as on mandatory labeling of GM 
food, information requirements, or potentially to support GM-free private standards.  
Key words: Genetically modified food, international trade, regulations, political economics.  
 
1.  Introduction 
During the last fifteen years, genetically modified (GM) crops have been produced, consumed, and traded 
in an increasing number of countries. Still, only a few GM crops have been commercialized, and even 
fewer have been produced at a large scale- soybeans, cotton, maize, and canola still represent the almost 
entirety of global GM crop area. An increasing number of GM events have been commercialized for each 
of these crops, but few of the same traits have been used to improve other crops. This specialization 
coupled with the continued growth in adoption has resulted in an increasing share of these four crops  
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being GM. Today most of soybeans, half of maize, about a third of global cotton production and an 
increasing share of canola are likely GM.
1  
Because these four crops are major agricultural commodities, GM products have been largely traded 
internationally,
2  but the presence of  diverging  importers’  preference  and  heterogeneous  trade-related 
regulations  have  resulted  in  a  double  segmentation  of  the  international  market.  First,  geographical 
differences  in  national,  regional  and  international  regulations,  in  association  with  GM-free  private 
standards, have contributed to the separation of markets for products that contain or may contain GM 
from their conventional counterparts purely based on non-GM material (with the purity level depending 
on each product, regulation, or standard). Second, each GM event
3 has been approved for production or 
import only in a limited set of countries, whereas many other countries have not adopted any regulations 
on the use of GM products.  
This double division (geographic and  event-based) has required an increased sophistication of food 
marketing systems worldwide. In particular,  traceability and identity preservation systems   have been 
developed to separate and track  specific GM and/or non-GM products from the field to their end uses. 
Several examples illustrate this complexity. Brazil exports large volume of GM soybeans to China, which 
does not allow the use of GM soybeans, and therefore segregates its GM imports from non-GM domestic 
soybeans. South Africa produces GM and non-GM maize, imports GM maize from Argentina but not 
from the United States, and exports milled GM maize and non -GM maize grains to specific Southern 
African countries, but not others (Gruere and Sengupta 2010). The United States exports large quantities 
of GM maize to countries like Mexico and the Philippines, but also non-GM soybean products to Japan 
and non-GM maize to South Korea.  
                                                           
1 For instance, the production of corn and soybeans in GM adopting countries represented 56% and 84% of the 
global production in 2005, respectively (own calculations based on FAOSTAT), and probably much more in 2010.  
2 GM soybean adopting nations covered over 94% of total soybean export volume and value in 2005, while GM 
corn adopting nations represented 80% of total volume and 77% of total value of corn the same year (estimates 
based on UN Comtrade).  
3 A GM event is a unique crop/trait combination commercialized (e.g., MON 810 Bt corn).  
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While the marketing system has adapted relatively quickly, it has also faced new challenges. On the 
seed side, some GM crops approved for particular purposes have moved to other countries or marketing 
channels  without  approval,  creating  trade  tensions  and  regulatory  reactions.
4  Moreover,  several  GM 
varieties that were being tested but not approved for use in any country have been unintentionally found 
in domestic and foreign markets. For example, two types of unapproved GM rice that were field tested in 
China and the United States  were detected there and in the European Union (EU) - creating a series of 
import bans despite limited risks involved (Ledford 2007). 
In this setting, trade-related regulations of GM food are key factors in understanding the dynamic of 
adoption of GM crops and the contribution of these technologies to global welfare. They affect exporters, 
importers, but can also have spillover effects on the regulatory and adoption decisions of countries that do 
not produce nor consume GM products (e.g., Paarlberg 2008). While officially designed for public goals, 
these regulations may also serve less laudable political goals, and have unwanted market effects (either 
domestically or internationally).  
The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of current and upcoming trade-related regulations 
of GM food, and to analyze their effects on trade, consumers, and producers in a comprehensive manner. 
More specifically, we  review  the effects  of import approval  authorization,  the  possible impact of 
documentation requirements for GM commodities , and the effects of  GM food labeling and GM-free 
private standards. Each type of regulation is analyzed based on available evidence from the literature, a 
qualitative assessment of key political actors and their role, and an analytical model  assessing their main 
trade and welfare effects and the possible rationale for their existence.  
Past literature on GM food and international trade has mostly focused on three issues: a) the choice of 
import regulations, b) the export side or the economic effects of trade-related regulations, and c) the issue 
of  global competition and GM technology adoption   (Smale et al. 2009) . More specifically, most 
published papers used simulation models to evaluate the potential effects of GM crop adoption in various 
                                                           
4 Starlink corn, for example, was intended for animal feed, not human consumption.  
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regions  under  different  regulatory  and  competition  scenarios.
5  Other ex-ante analyses focus on the 
optimal  choice  of  regulations  (e.g.,  Plastina  and  Giannakas  2007 ),  or  on  positive  evaluations  of 
introducing new trade-related regulations (e.g., Gruere and Rosegrant 2009). Fewer studies provide ex-
post analyses, perhaps because of insufficient time series  data available. Among those, a few papers 
analyze the observed trade effects of GM adoption in the presence of  existing regulations (Purcell and 
Kalaitzandonakes 2004; Smyth, Kerr, and Davey 2006, Vigani et al. 2009), while others try to explain the 
current pattern of regulations (Anderson and Jackson 2003, Graff et al. 2009, Gruere et al. 2009).  
This paper aims to add to the very last category and provide a primer on trade-related regulations of 
GM food. While referring to the results other studies, the paper aims to be a positive analysis of current 
and upcoming regulations. Unlike previous contributions, the goal is to assess trade-related regulations in 
a comprehensive manner, and provide the reader with a synthetic and political economic outlook of the 
growing complexity of the GM trade regulatory world.  
In what follows, we define GM food as raw and processed products derived from GM crops and used 
for food and/or animal feed.
6 To our knowledge,  there are no trade-related regulations on non-food or 
non-feed products from GM crops (e.g., cotton fibers derived from GM cotton),
7 so we do not consider 
those. The paper is organized as follows. After defining our model, we first look at import approval, then 
consider traded shipment requirements,  and market regulations and standards in the importing country. 
We conclude on  the  current and future  challenges of adapting to an increasingly complex trading 
environment.  
2.  The basic model 
                                                           
5 See Smale et al. (2009) for a list of recent papers that include developing countries.  
6 These products represented an average trade value of $42 billion/year for 2000-2004 (Gruere 2006). 
7Cotton is however subject to GM-free private standards like organic or fair trade labeling.   
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We use a three-country partial equilibrium model to represent the present situation for a food or feed 
crop. Because most of the current GM crop producers are also exporters,
8 we separate the GM exporter 
from two types of non-adopting importers. Let country A be producing GM and non-GM variants of the 
product and exporting both to the world. More specifically, A produces two GM events , a past event g1 
and a new event g2 of the same product. Based on export market requirements, A can also produce a 
conventional non-GM version n which can be separated from the GM marketing channel using a costly 
identity preservation system at cost cs. Country B, which will be the main focus of our analysis, produces 
n but is also a net importer of products from A and has specific regulations for GM crops. Country C is 
another importer of products from A without specific regulations for GM or non-GM.
9 
To assess the welfare effect of each regulation, we make some simplifying assumption s. In Country 
A, we focus on exporting producers. In country B, we assess the effects of new regulation on  domestic 
producers and on three groups of consumers: non -GM consumers, indifferent consumers that disregard 
the presence of GM or non-GM in their purchasing choices, and switching consumers with a propensity to 
change their purchasing decision according to the labeling policy (Bansal and Gruere 2010). In country C, 
we will evaluate the effects of regulations on producers and consumers.  
Regulations in country B are  the results of political decisions, which indirectly depend on welfare 
effects of the main pressure groups. We use the framework of Gruere et al. (2009) on GM food labeling 
as a basis of analysis ,  with the addition   of food safety  as a public goal.  Three  main  groups are 
represented: agricultural producers AP, consumers/voters CV (which includes the three subgroups), and 
non-governmental bodies NO (that represent anti and pro-GM groups). While producers and consumers’ 
positions are determined by economic welfare, NO’s welfare depends on the balance of forces on the 
ground- if the anti-GM forces dominate they will push for a non-GM agenda, and conversely.  
                                                           
8 See Footnote 2. 
9 These countries could be representing regions, such as North America and Argentina (A), European and Asian 
nations with GM regulations and low or no GM adoption (B), and many of the remaining developing nations (C).    
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l(.) is the welfare function associated with the regulation, and σ
kl is an 
idiosyncratic parameter representing voter k's belief. For simplicity we assume that σ
kl is drawn from a 




l>0). In each group, 
the indifferent member (or swing voter) is defined by the parameter σ




voter k such that σ
kl < σ




Each group determines his position according to a vote equivalent. The intensity of the message 
delivered by each group depends on the proportion of members approving it. The adoption decision by 
policymakers will be made according to the weighted sum of support of each group. We compute the 
probability of voting or the proportion of vote equivalents for a particular regulation R as: V(R)=∑ γ
lF(σ
l) 
where  F(.)  is  the  cumulative  density  function  (c.d.f.)  of  σ  and  γ
l  is  the  political  weight  of  group  l. 
Substituting the c.d.f of the Uniform distribution, this gives:  
                        (1) 
To  obtain  a  majority  of  vote  equivalents  for  the  regulation,  the  second  term  has  to  be  positive: 
. Thus, three factors affect the outcome: the weight given to each group in the final decision 
(γ
l), the degree of homogeneity in each group (φ
l), and the welfare change associated with the new policy 
for each group (σ
l).     
At the end, the policymaker will balance the will of its constituents V(R) with his own assessment 
of safety related matters, which is represented by the relative difference in perceived safety ΔS with the 
regulation compared to the status quo ΔS=(S(R)-S(NR))/S(NR). The utility score of the decision maker for 
a particular regulation is assumed to be the following:  
        (2)  
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Because ΔS and V(R) are set to be in [0,1], this function is also within [0,1], and it is set up to ensure that 
perceived safety effects dominate constituents’ preference. This “total utility score” will lead to a yes 
decision for any score greater or equal to ½. 
While the weight and concentration parameters depend on the country and group, the welfare 
effects σ
l will be computed in the respective groups (producers AP, consumers CV) in each country. For 
simplification, we assume a linear supply and demand in the three countries with the following functional 
forms for product i in country j:   on the supply side and   on the 
demand side. Unless specified for particular scenarios, we assume that 
.   Ψi(λ)  represents the utility  shifter  for  the  quality component  of the  product  as 
perceived by consumers of country B. It depends on the type of consumers and labeling regulations as 
defined in Table 1. For simplicity, we assume that non-GM consumers will always try to avoid GM 





Table 1. Product consumed and quality function Ψk (λ) for the three consumer groups in country B 
Type of consumers  Non-GM  Switching  Indifferent 
No labeling  Mixed / -λ  Mixed/ 0  Mixed/0 
Voluntary labeling  Non-GM / λ  GM/0  GM/0 
Mandatory labeling  Non-GM/ λ  Non-GM/ λ  GM/0 
GM-free private standards  Non-GM/ λ  Non-GM/ 0  Non-GM/0 
 
Prices are obtained by setting excess supply equal to excess demand in the world market for each specific 
product. Producer welfare in all countries is defined by profits   where pi and Qi are 
the prices and quantities, and   is the unit cost function for variant i. Consumer welfare is 
equal to the Marshallian consumer surplus (CS) in countries A and C. In country B, we define it as:  
                                                           
10 More flexible models could be used to capture changes in variants- e.g., see Gruere et al. (2008).   
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         (3) 
where T(R) is the possible tax imposed with each regulation and αt is the share of consumers of group t 
(Non-GM noted NG, switching S, indifferent I). The model is solved by a) determining the price(s) at 
equilibrium, b) computing the welfare effects, c) assessing the majority of vote equivalent in B, and d) 
determining the decision maker’s utility score.  
 
3.  Regulating imports: import approval and low level presence 
The first and most important regulation is the authorization to import a specific GM event in a given 
country.  There  are  two  distinct  issues:  importing  seeds  or  planting  material  for  experiment  or  crop 
production,  and  importing  GM  products  or  processed  products  derived  thereof.  Since  we  focus  on 
commodity trade of GM food products, we will  only treat of the approval for products intended for 
processing, food or feed.  
Not all countries have implemented import regulations for GM products, but those that have 
typically require an application with food or feed safety data from  the developer for each new GM 
product (Gruere  2006). The  product then  goes through  an  evaluation by  a  scientific  body  giving  an 
opinion, but the final approval decision depends on policymakers. Although the exact modalities differ 
across countries, the food safety data requirements tend to be relatively similar, following OECD and 
Codex Alimentarius principles, even if the assessment may be more or less strict. Carter and Gruere 
(2006) provide a review of the approval processes in Japan, Australia and New Zealand, and the European 
Union (EU). They note that the observed differences are mainly at the policy level, where different layers 
of political representations are involved.  
While most developed countries have functional import regulatory systems, other countries can 
be divided into those that have not enforced their regulations, those with no regulations, and those with  
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official bans of GM products (Gruere 2006). Very few countries have official bans of GM products, and 
they are mostly in Southern Africa (Gruere and Sengupta 2010). Most developing countries have no 
regulation,  but  may  apply  some  regulations  in  the  future,  following  guidance  under  the  Cartagena 
Protocol  on  Biosafety  (CPB)  to  which  they  are  members.  Among  others,  the  CPB  allows  rejecting 
imports even in the absence of proven risk, but this bears the risk of being in violation of countries’ WTO 
obligations (Winham 2003).  
Even among developed countries, several regulations have been slow to become functional, and 
still face political challenges. A key example is that of the EU, which applied a moratorium on new GM 
varieties from 1998 to 2003. This moratorium was the object of a WTO dispute launched by Canada, 
Argentina and the United States in 2003. The 2006 ruling by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body did not 
provide any qualified opinion on scientific matters, but did found that the EU violated the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement (WTO 2006) and requested the EU members to change their regulations 
and stop the moratorium. If the EU revised its regulatory system to a certain extent, several EU members 
still have to comply with this decision.
11 
The main issue of an importing regulating country is to ensure the safety of incoming products . 
Therefore the goal is to reject  all unapproved material at the border, regardless of quantities, but  this 
proves to be challenging if not unrealistic in a globalized economy. In principle, a country would prefer to 
have a 0% tolerance for non -approved GM events. However, because GM products  are largely traded 
commodities in a bulk marketing system, accidentally mixing frequently occur, and is often unavoidable, 
resulting  in  low level  presence  of  different  types  of  GM  events in  commodity  shipments.
12  The 
multiplication of approval of GM events in large exporting countries  associated with lengthy approval 
                                                           
11 Since then, Canada has concluded an agreement the EU to settle the dispute. The United States has also been 
discussing a similar agreement with the EU (ITCSD 2009).  
12 In fact, the accidental presence of non approved material is a well known reality- for instance the presence of non-
grain organic material (animal and plant waste) is commonly accepted in traded shipments below 2%.   
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processes at importers has resulted in an increasing pressure on regulating importers to  lift their 0% 
tolerance.   
This phenomenon, called asynchronous approval of GM events, has created a number of incidents 
where the importing countries had to reject large shipments of grains or oilseeds, because of minute traces 
of unapproved GM material at the port (Gruere 2009, Stein et al. 2009). As a consequence, importers had 
to substitute for other non-GM products at a higher cost, sometimes paying a significant premium to 
avoid traces of unapproved GM events.  
Economically, while approval regulations will be beneficial to all consumers if they do increase 
the safety of imported food, they bear two types of costs. First, obtaining approval in each country of 
import is a fixed cost for biotech developing companies in the exporting country. While these companies 
had to obtain approval for production in the country, each importer has slightly different testing and 
documentation requirements, that add to the overall cost of marketing a product. Second, if the importing 
country’s approval decision happens after the commercialization in the exporting country (assuming a 0% 
tolerance level), the importers face a temporary tariff equivalent, in the sense that they have to procure a 
substitute for the original mixed GM commodity at a higher price until approval is granted. This tariff 
equivalent also applies to commodities transported in the same fashion- e.g., soybean or wheat shipments 
can be found to contain trace levels of unapproved maize.  
This temporary barrier is eliminated when the import authorization is granted, but it can also 
remain in place indefinitely if it is used as pretext for regulatory reform. South Africa provides a key 
example (Gruere and Sengupta 2010). In 2003, under pressure by domestic maize producers, the GM 
import authorization procedure (called commodity clearance) was eliminated, and since then imports have 
been subject to the regular procedure for a new GM crop planting approval. Thus, no GM product can be 
imported unless it shows no environmental risk and a significant agronomic advantage for farmers. This 
decision, which was highly contested by the animal feed industry, has resulted in the blocking of U.S.  
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imports of maize that may contain a GM maize event resistant to corn rootworm, because this GM event 
does not provide any agronomic advantage in South Africa.  
The  use  of  zero  percent  tolerance  levels  by  major  importing  countries  has  also  created  a 
disincentive to the development and use of publically developed GM crops especially in developing 
countries. The fact that a minimum trace of unapproved GM event in countries of the EU or Japan can 
trigger bans or penalties creates new challenges for public biotech research organizations. To avoid this 
situation, public sector developers would need to obtain approval in all major countries, a significant 
additional cost they may not always be able to bear. In some cases, these organizations can also face a 
rejection by domestic authorities if potential export risks are considered in an approval decision. South 
Africa  recently  rejected  the  commercialization  of  the  first  publically-developed  GM  potato  variety 
intended solely for small-scale non-exporters, mostly because of the fear of export loss of the commercial 
potato industry. 
Past studies have tried to track the effect of GM regulations on trade and found a relatively small 
effect (Cadot et al. 2003, Parcell and Kalaitzandonakes 2004, Smythe et al 2008). These studies generally 
did not separate the effects by type of regulation, and it is therefore difficult to assess the effect of import 
approval. Nonetheless, while focusing on transatlantic exchanges, they tend to find that trade was not 
affected  significantly  by  GM  policies  in  the  recent  past,  even  if  trade  diversion  may  have  occurred 
because of GM regulations. In a different setting, however, cases where a domestically unapproved GM 
event did enter the global commodity chain, like Starlink, or the more recent Liberty Link Rice 601, did 
have  significant  market  effects  (Carter  and  Smith  2007).  These  cases  generated  series  of  bans  of 
commodities in many countries at a huge cost for domestic producers.  
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To assess the potential welfare implications of  these regulations, we compare five scenarios, 
defined in Table 2.
13 Each scenario represents a step in the approval procedure of new GM events in 
Country A, with different regulatory response in country B.  
Table 2. Scenarios with import approval 
Country  A  B  C 
Scenario 0: No regulation  Exports g1  Imports g1   Imports g1 
Scenario 1: B bans g1  Exports g1 and n  Imports n at a cost cs  Imports g1 
Scenario 2: B approves g1  Exports g1  Imports g1   Imports g1 
Scenario 3: A approves g2  Exports g1 and g2   Imports g1 at a cost cs  Imports g2 
Scenario 4: g2 approved in B  Exports g2  Imports g2   Imports g2 
 
 
Table 3. Equilibrium prices under the five scenarios. 













                                                           
13 We assume that A will produce non-GM under scenario 1, which will only happen with a sufficiently small cost 
of segregation. If it is prohibitive, the price of non-GM is the autarky price in B.   
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Setting  up  demands  and  supplies,  we  obtain  the  equilibrium  prices  shown  in  Table  3. 
Comparative statics show that, under our assumptions,  , , and   . Under 
most likely conditions,
14  and  . The comparisons between the world prices and   or  
  are  much  more ambiguous and depend   on demand and supply parameters.   If the  supply effect 
dominates, the price of GM  in scenarios 1 or 3  will be higher than the price witho ut trade restriction 
(scenarios 0, 2 and 4). If the drop in demand dominates, the price of GM will be lower than world prices 
with the same technology.  Nonetheless, this partial comparison can  help rank scenarios for welfare as 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4. Comparison of scenarios in terms of welfare in the three countries. 
  Producer welfare  Consumer welfare 
Country 
A 
Example (scenario 0):  
 
Due  to  segregation  costs,  1  and  3 
less beneficial, 4 is better than 2 and 
0.  
Example (scenario 0):    
Best outcome under scenarios 3 or 4. 
Country 
B 
Example (scenario 1):  
 
Most  likely  ranking:  1  >3  >2  ≥  0 
>4. 
Example (scenario.1):  
  
Overall, 4 better than 2, which is better than 0.  3 is the worst 
market outcome, 1 is best for non-GM consumers.   
Country 
C 
Example (scenario 2): 
   
Better off under 0 or 2, compared to 
4. 1 is better than 3. 
Example (scenario 2):        
   
Best market outcome under 3 or 4, but it depends on additional 
risk with g2. 
 
                                                           
14 Especially-but not only- if the share of non-GM consumers is important, that they are strongly opposed to GM 
and/or if the cost of segregation is non-trivial.  
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While approval regulations can be beneficial to guarantee the safety of consumers (scenario 2 is 
better than 0), delayed approval processes (scenario 3) can be expensive and detrimental to consumers, 
particularly those that are not adamantly opposed to GM. Consumers in C may gain from such situation 
(scenario 3), if the exporter’s product approval has been sufficiently rigorous and the product does not 
represent additional risks. On the supply side, B producers naturally benefit from stricter regulations on 
imports, while producers in A may lose if the segmentation under (1 or 3) is costly, and C producers can 
win or lose depending on structural parameters.  
In vote equivalents, in country B, a sufficient condition for    is that all groups 
benefit from the regulations, i.e. σ
l ≥0. Producers will have positive welfare gains compared to the status-
quo (scenario 0) in scenarios 1, 2 and 3. Of these, 1 and 3 may lead to positive or negative welfare effects 
for consumers, while 2 is positive for both consumers and producers. This means that, assuming the non-
governmental group NO is not strictly opposed to an approval regulation,
15 V(R)>1/2.   
Overall,  given  these  results,  if  the  decision  maker  believes  that  an  import  approval  procedure 
increases (or does not decrease) consumer safety (ΔS > 0), he will pass a regulation as 
. A ban (scenario 1) may occur if the decision maker is convinced that any GM is risky despite 
contradicting scientific evidence, if producers have a strong political weight (γ
AP),
16 and/or if non-GM 
consumers largely dominate the population ( ) with a very high willingness to avoid GM (λ). A 
non-tariff barrier (scenario 3) can appear if the imports are low, and the local producers have a strong 
representation,  a  higher  voice  than  consumers  (γ
AP>  γ




                                                           
15 This is unlikely given that B does not produce GM. 
16 For instance, in Zimbabwe, where consumers have no voice, domestic producer lobbies have been strong 
supporter of a GM maize ban, despite expected disastrous consequences (Gomo 2010). In Zambia, the president did 
ban imports in 2002 largely to support domestic producers’ interest (Gruere and Sengupta 2009a).   
16 
 
4.  Information requirements on shipments under the Protocol 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (CPB) entered into force in September 2003 with the goal of setting 
up  a  harmonized  framework  of  risk  assessment,  risk  management  and  information  sharing  on  the 
transboundary  movements  of  living  modified  organisms  (LMOs).  Among  the  key  measures  of  the 
Protocol, there are specific rules for LMOs intended for direct uses as food, feed or processing (noted 
LMO-FFPs), which are essentially unprocessed GM commodities. These products represent more than 
half of total import values of the four main GM commodities (Gruere 2006).
17  
In particular, Article 18.2.a of the Protocol requires that each traded shipment of LMO -FFPs be 
labeled as “may contain” LMO-FFPs not intended for release in the environment, though it also noted that 
a more specific rule on information requirements should be determined at a later date. At a March 2006 
meeting in Brazil, Protocol members agreed to adopt a two-option rule consisting of a more stringent 
option and the less stringent one that had previously been in effect. Under the stringent option, shipments 
containing  LMO-FFPs  identified  through  means  such  as  identity-preservation (IP)  systems  would  be 
labeled as “does contain” LMO-FFPs and would include a precise list of all GM events present in each 
shipment. Shipments containing LMO-FFPs that are not well-identified would follow previous practice 
and would be labeled as “may contain” LMO-FFPs. At the same time, a complete list of GM events 
commercialized in the  exporting  country  would  be  available to importers  via  the  Biosafety  Clearing 
House (BCH), an internet database. At the same meeting, protocol members also agreed that the two-
option rule would be reconsidered in 2010, with the possibility of making the stringent “does contain” 
option mandatory for all countries in 2012 (Gruere and Rosegrant 2009).  
While the benefits of this proposed regulatory change are not clear, its implementation would 
generate significant new costs (e.g., Gruere and Rosegrant 2009). More specifically, under the “does 
contain” rule, countries that export GM would have to test each shipment to verify the accuracy of GM-
                                                           
17 Approximately 51% of soybeans and 88% of maize import value comes from unprocessed commodities (Gruere 
2006).   
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event identification. Even if the GM-producing countries export a non-GM commodity, they would still 
have to conduct additional tests in order to make sure the quantity of GM crops in the shipment was lower 
than the potential threshold levels set up by importers. Importing CPB member countries would also need 
to pay for the IP system or to conduct tests to confirm the validity of shipment statements in order to 
ensure enforcement of these requirements.  
Previous studies have analyzed the likely economic implications of adopting the “does contain” 
rule in different countries, such as Argentina (Direccion Nacional de Mercados Agroalimentarios 2004), 
the United States (Kalaitzandonakes 2004) or Australia (Foster and Galeano 2006), reporting that the 
costs  of  such  change  would  be  potentially  significant.  Using  a  multi-region  computable  general 
equilibrium model, Huang et al. (2008) show that it would affect the prices of maize and soybeans, 
increasing world prices overall. While their results show that the cost of implementation would be large 
globally, but not really significant for China (their focus country), they note that smaller developing 
countries  would  likely  pay  a  higher  price.  Gruere  and  Rosegrant  (2009)  assess  the  potential 
implementation costs of article 18.2.a on all countries member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation, 
and provide a range of cost estimates for exporters and importers, noting the disproportional cost for less 
developing countries that have been supportive of this measure. They also show that it would effectively 
constitute a new entry cost for GM adoption and for Protocol membership in this region.  
Economically, the benefits are difficult to measure, simply because they are not obvious, unless 
one counts the use a GM event list as justification for a ban, for the benefit of a policy maker’s popularity. 
As long as there are at least two GM events being exported, the measure will act as a selective tariff that 
depends on testing requirement and the degree of enforcement by importers. This technical barrier will 
likely  apply  to  all  products,  whether  GM  or  not,  coming  from  GM  producing  countries,  but  unlike 
scenario 3, it will be a lasting and limited tariff, not a temporary potentially prohibitive one. Furthermore, 
it will apply to many more countries, because many developing countries without regulations are CPB 
members.    
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The proposed regulation is modeled as an additional transport cost for GM and non-GM for A to 
B and C, assuming that B and C are CPB members. We use an alternative to scenario 4 as the basis of 
analysis. In scenario 4, A only produces and exports g2 to A and B, but here we assume that g1 is still 
present in the commodity chain (as a residual presence or due to stocks) when the measure enters into 
force. All shipments have to be tested to know whether there is g1 or not. Assuming a per unit cost τ, we 
obtain the following new price for the world: 
 
Naturally, we find that  . For B, it will slightly increase the cost of imports and raise 
domestic prices, for C it will include new costs for consumers. A exporters will all lose. The rent will go 
to testing companies present in A, B and C. The situation is slightly different if C is not member: the price 
of the good may fall in C to the benefit of consumers and at the detriment of producers.  
The observed support among CPB members for this new regulation is singular, as it is essentially 
unrelated to safety (Gruere and Rosegrant 2009) and therefore seems to be mostly driven by anti-GM 
sentiments. Assuming that the decision maker does not consider it a safety related matter, his decision 
function  simplifies  to: .  Knowing  that  consumers  will  lose,  B’s 
decision maker will support it ( ) only if producers vocally push for it (large   
with  support  from  anti-GM  lobbies  and  minimum  opposition  from  consumers  (e.g.,  assuming  τ  is 
relatively small or that they are uninformed about this technical measure).  
At the international level, Country C may or may not support the decision, depending on the voice of 
consumers.  A  lot  of  developing  countries  (especially  in  Africa)  have  let  their  environmental 
representatives support this measure as an additional restriction to what they see as potentially hazardous 
products, that need to be labeled as such, without accounting for unaware consumers and the effect it 
would have on prices (Gruere and Rosegrant 2009).   
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5.  Marketing regulations and standards 
Three types of marketing policies have trade-related implications: traceability, GM labeling, and GM-free 
private standards. This section will only briefly discuss the EU traceability requirements, to mainly focus 
on labeling policies and private standards, and their role on affecting demand, prices and market access. 
Traceability is an important regulatory requirement for GM traded products, but it is only applied 
in the EU since 2004. The main differences between traceability and other marketing policies are its focus 
on safety and the fact that its implementation cost focus solely on GM products and suppliers. Labeling 
policies are not designed as safety measure (Gruere and Rao 2007). Moreover, in most cases, the cost of 
labeling will be borne by non-GM providers, either because exporters want to signal their non-GM status 
(voluntary labeling/private standard) or because they want to avoid a GM label (mandatory labeling) in 
markets adverse to GM. On the one hand, this GM-target is justified by the fact that traceability is 
designed  to  help  conduct  recall  in  cases  of  food  safety  crises.  On  the  other  hand,  this  regulatory 
requirement adds a new cost of entry to the EU for GM products only, which may be beneficial to 
domestic non-GM producers that represent a very large majority of producers in the EU. Essentially 
traceability can be modeled as a safety measure with a significant fixed cost (setting up a tracking system) 
plus some smaller variable costs (labor, tests, documentation, archives) that are applied solely to GM 
imports.  While  industrialized  or  large-scale  exporters  may  be  able  to  comply  with  it  without  much 
difficulty, traceability may prevent others to export GM products to the EU, as observed in other markets. 
In contrast, many countries have adopted GM food labeling policies. The economic implications 
of GM labeling have been largely discussed in the literature; this section will only focus on labeling and 
trade. While a large number of labeling policies have been adopted over the world (Gruere and Rao 
2007),  there  is  a  clear  dichotomy  in  labeling  approaches  between  voluntary  labeling  and  mandatory 
labeling (e.g., Runge and Jackson 2000).   
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Mandatory labeling requires food companies to display the presence of certain GM ingredients 
(or ingredients derived from GM crops) on food products over a specific threshold level. Each regulation 
has  a  different  coverage  and  different  exemptions.  While  developed  countries  have  relatively  well 
enforced regulations, virtually all developing countries still have to enforce their regulations (Gruere and 
Rao 2007). Unlike other consumer regulations, mandatory labeling directly applies to decisions for food 
companies, not consumers, and therefore does not guaranty consumer choice (Gruere et al. 2008). Still, 
the companies’ decision to use GM ingredients is indirectly related to consumer preference. The cost 
structure  of  labeling  and  its  effect  on  demand  by  food  companies  (and  ultimately  consumers)  are 
primordial in its ultimate market effect. Together with the degree of enforcement, these factors largely 
predict what the effect of labeling will be in a particular market (Bansal and Gruere 2010).  
Consequently, the trade effect of labeling also depends on these three factors. So far, the evidence 
has shown that companies have been keen to avoid labeling their products as GM in virtually all countries 
with enforced mandatory labeling regulation. China is the only confirmed exception where GM labeling 
resulted in all targeted products being labeled as GM (with a limited demand shift see Lin et al. 2008).  
While there is evidence that trade considerations play a role in explaining labeling regulations 
(Gruere et al. 2009, Vigani et al. 2009), introducing a mandatory labeling policy  does not guarantee 
market  access.  Having  a  domestic  labeling  policy  in  the  exporting  country  may  be  reassuring  for 
importers,  assuming  the  labeling  is  actually  enforced.  But  labeling  domestic  consumer  goods  will 
generally not be sufficient to obtain market access to a labeling country. For instance, introducing GM 
labeling in India would not help basmati rice exporters keep their non-GM market in Europe, while it 
would bear significant costs to an entire country (Bansal and Gruere 2010). Regardless of the domestic 
labeling  policy,  these  exporters  will  need  to  ensure  that  their  rice  is  non-GM.  A  more  convincing 
explanation  relates  to  trade  agreements  and  political  influence;  in  a  bipolar  regulatory  world,  
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memberships  to  free  trade  agreements  seem  to  be  increasingly  used  to  support  a  particular  position 
(precautionary or science-based) on GM regulations.
18 
The case of voluntary labeling is fundamentally different in that it is a bottom -up approach. 
Companies may or may not decide to label their products as GM or non-GM; non-labeling is an option. In 
a perfectly competitive market with no political distortion, voluntary labeling may lead to exactly the 
same outcome as mandatory labeling for consumers (Bansal and Ramaswami 2007). But its outcome will 
be more directly linked to consumer demand than mandatory labeling (Gruere et al. 2008). 
Currently, voluntary labeling schemes apply to non -GM products in market  in the presence of 
consumers willing to pay to avoid GM products. A large share of the non-GM products available in retail 
market  is  in  fact  organic  before  being  non -GM.  Still,  non -GM,  non-organic  grains  are  traded 
internationally. For instance, the Japanese Tokyo Grain Exchange does have a quote for non -GM 
soybeans that are sold for a significant price premium.
19  
In certain countries  like Japan or South Korea, non -GM claims have long been displayed  on 
numerous products, despite the existence of a mandatory labeling policy,  as publicity and potentially a 
support for stricter standards than those in the official mandatory labeling policy.
20 The growing market 
presence of non-GM labels in these countrie s  demonstrates the  low  informative value of mandatory 
labeling of GM food. Non-GM labels would appear without mandatory labeling in these countries, but it 
would not prevent other GM products to appear on the retail shelves (Gruere et al. 2008). 
Voluntary labeling claims are generally supported by GM-free private standards that are set up by 
food companies, traders or retailers (Knight et al. 2008). But while these standards can use labeling as a 
selling argument, not all GM-free private standards are associated with non-GM labels. A number of large 
                                                           
18  Certain countries in Asia were reportedly encouraged to adopt mandatory labeling of GM food as a precursor to 
discussing free trade agreements (FTAs) with the EU (personal conversation with national Codex representatives on 
labeling, February 2009), while others (like Malaysia or South Korea) had to balance their interest for FTAs with the 
United States with their labeling regulations (Ahn 2008, Merrett 2007).  
19 Gruere (2009) shows that the average premium for non-GM soybean sold in this market were about 24% in 2008. 
20 The same trend is occurring in Europe where non-GM claims have recently been allowed.  
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food companies use  blanket  GM-free private standards (often on all products), without using it as a 
selling point. For instance, General Mills and Frito-Lay apply non-GM policies without non-GM claims 
in the United States (Gruere et al. 2008). McDonalds’ decision to reject GM potatoes has resulted in the 
abandonment  of  Bt  potato  in  North  America  (Gruere  and  Sengupta  2009a).  The  rationale  for  such 
standard may be a combination of brand and reputation insurance at a low cost.  
While set up privately and therefore not official “regulations”, these standards increasingly decide 
what product gains market access. Before mandatory labeling was fully enforced in the EU, several 
retailers companies had already set up GM-free policies (Bernauer 2003, Gruere and Sengupta 2009a). 
With market concentration, these standards rapidly started to affect the type of GM products sold in 
countries of Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan or South Korea, in the favor of animal feed.
21 There 
is also evidence that GM-free private standards at importers have played a signific ant role in biosafety 
policy making in developing countries (Gruere and Sengupta 2009a).  
The model is used to assess the welfare effects and rationale for these different approaches. Three 
scenarios are considered, as shown in Table 5. Country B’s demand differs according to the group of 
consumers and the standards (following Table 1). We assume that mandatory labeling results in a small 
share of GM products, not a corner solution with only non-GM, but scenario 8 represents a case with a 
corner solution. Segregation costs differ according to the specific policy, with voluntary labeling bearing 
an additional marketing cost K (following Gruere et al. 2008). Lastly, we assume that A will export non-





                                                           
21 Labeling may have generalized this phenomenon in these markets to filter only products exempted from 
regulatory requirements. 
22 More flexible models could address this issue; here, we focus on the current market situation with coexistence in 
most exporters.  
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Table 5. Scenarios with marketing standards 
Country  A  B  C 
Scenario 6: Voluntary labeling in B  Exports g2 and n  αNG consume non-GM  Imports g2 
Scenario 7: Mandatory labeling in B  Exports g2 and n  αNG+ αS consume non-GM  Imports g2 
Scenario 8: GM-free private standards in B  Exports g2 and n  All consume non-GM   Imports g2 
 
Table 6. Equilibrium prices in the three scenarios. 
Scenario  GM (sold in A, B, and C)  Non-GM (sold in B) 
6. Voluntary labeling     
7. Mandatory labeling     
8. GM-free private 
standard 
   
 
The equilibrium prices are shown in Table 6. While the price of GM is always inferior to the 
price of non-GM, the comparison across scenario is more ambiguous. The price of non-GM will be the 
highest under the private standard policy if the demand shift dominates.
23 Voluntary labeling may also 
generate a higher non-GM price than mandatory labeling if the cost of labeling is large and the proportion 
of switching consumers relatively small (two realistic assumptions).
24 The price of GM will be the lowest 
under the private standard scenario, but the ranking of the two others will depend on demand and supply 
parameters. If the demand shift dominates,
25 voluntary labeling will  generate a higher GM price than 
                                                           
23 In particular:   . 
24 More specifically:   .   
25 More specifically:   .  
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mandatory labeling. Comparing these prices with the case of scenario 4, with a non-differentiated market, 
we find that under plausible parameters, prices of non-GM will be higher, while the price of GM may be 
lower or higher than the unified price. To sum up, we find that the most likely rankings will be:  
 and  . Using these qualitative ranking we compare the welfare 
effects of each policy in Table 7. 
 
Table 7.  Welfare effects under the three scenarios. 
Country  Producer welfare  Consumer welfare 
A  Example (scenario 6):  
  
If non-GM is a market niche, scenario 6 is the 
best outcome and may be better than 4. 
Example (scenario 6):      
Scenario 8 will be better than scenarios 6 and 7.  
The comparison between 8 and 4 is ambiguous. 
B  Example (scenario 7):  
 
 Unambiguous ranking: 8 ≥ 6 ≥ 7 >4 
Example (scenario 7): 
  
  , and   are critical in  the ranking:  marketing 
regulations are better than 4 if   is sufficiently large, 
and if T(R) is small compared to   , 7 will be preferred.  
In contrast, if   is large, the ranking becomes: 4≥ 6≥ 
7≥ 8. 
C  Example (scenario 8):    
Scenarios 6 and 7 are better than 8 and 4. 
Example (scenario 8) :  
Same ranking as consumers in A. 
 
Voluntary labeling appears to be potentially welfare enhancing regulations for producers of A and 
C, and has a low effect on these countries’ consumers, which may explain why it is rare to see voluntary  
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labeling measures in regulating countries that do not produce GM. In contrast, country B’s producers and 
consumers (if largely in favor of non-GM, and assuming low tax rate), will prefer mandatory labeling, 
which will reduce consumer welfare in A and C. Private standards are preferred by producers in B and 
potentially consumers in A and C.  
Interestingly, the results show that the main gains of mandatory labeling (with or without a corner 
solution)
26 are obtained by the domestic producers in any labeling country that does not produce GM. In 
effect, whether labeling results in a demand shift towards non-GM or if it only creates additional costs to 
import GM products (that are in fact mixed GM/non-GM), domestic producers cannot lose and may gain 
substantial rents. This protectionist effect is unambiguous and may be visible in the push for  mandatory 
labeling in non-GM food producing countries. For example, in India, the push for a strict  mandatory 
labeling policy in India in 2006 was  vocally supported by  domestic producers of vegetable oils that 
wanted to limit imports and increase the domestic price of their products at a time of low  world prices 
(Bansal and Gruere 2010).  
At the decision making level, assuming it is non-safety related (as argued in EU and elsewhere),
27 
 and strict mandatory labeling in the EU and other countries can be explained 
by a consensus between  domestic producers ( ), market dominating  non-GM consumers (that 
would drive   to be large and positive) and anti-GM organizations (large  ), that dominate 
the public debate.
28 In importing countries with less vocal civil society and/or consumer concerns (small 
 and  ), domestic producers may be sufficient to the introduction of mandatory labeling, as seen in 
some transition developing countries.  
GM-free standards are in principle driven by consumer aversion to GM, but the results suggest 
that non-GM consumers may not gain as much as domestic producers from such policy. Given that these 
                                                           
26 Scenario 8 is equivalent to mandatory labeling reaching a corner solution with no GM product sold in B.  
27 Gruere and Rao (2007). 
28 This is consistent with Gruere et al. (2009)  
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standards are set up by food companies rather than governments, we cannot apply the same decision 
making model. But it is interesting to see that food companies may raise the cost of their non-GM inputs 
by setting up these standards. Anti-GM and “green” organizations probably play a key role in pushing 
companies to go GM-free (especially via their targeted internet campaigns against GM products).  
Until recently, avoiding GM products in food items was not excessively costly, because of the small 
share of potentially GM ingredients in food products, and the wide availability of non-GM substitutes. 
But recent developments in the international food markets have demonstrated that prices matter in these 
decisions. While they were avoiding GM maize, the spike in maize prices in 2007-08 did result in certain 
Korean and Japanese companies processing maize to switch back to GM maize. The recent declarations 
by executives in European food companies, on the potential role of GM in food production, seem to 
indicate a possible change of direction in the future (Gruere and Sengupta 2009b).  
6.  Conclusion: the challenges of an increasingly complex trading environment 
This  paper  provided  a  synthesis  of  current  trade  related  regulations  of  GM  food,  from  import 
authorization to market access and commercialization. A simplified welfare and political economic model 
was developed to assess the welfare effects of each type of regulation and analyze their possible adoption. 
The results  of  the  analysis  show  that  in  a  non-GM  producing  country,  trade-related  regulations  will 
benefit producers, but not necessarily consumers. An import authorization that increases safety without 
raising costs significantly (i.e., with measures to avoid asynchronous approvals) will benefit consumers 
and producers. The effect of labeling regulations on consumers is ambiguous and depends on the share of 
GM averse and indifferent consumers, and the willingness to pay of the former to avoid GM products. A 
developing country with low consumer aversion and/or willingness to pay will be much better off with 
voluntary labeling than mandatory labeling. Lastly, proposed information requirements under the CPB do 
not provide any benefit to consumers, regardless of their characteristics.  
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Based on this welfare analysis, we assessed the political support needed for an importing country 
to introduce each regulation. While consumers may play a role in supporting an import approval process, 
provided it does not result in a ban, producers’ support is likely to be instrumental to push for a ban, for 
information requirements on shipments, or for mandatory labeling of GM food products. Outside pressure 
groups will play the role of swing voters in cases where consumers and producers do not agree, such as on 
mandatory labeling, information requirements, or potentially to support GM-free private standards.  
The model also illustrates the fact that trade-related regulations are likely to affect third countries 
via price transmission effects. But in reality the spillover effects of trade regulations are much broader. 
These regulations have played a critical role in limiting the market to few GM crops in few countries. In 
particular, the fear of export losses to countries with GM regulations has been a key constraint in the use 
of public-driven GM crops particularly in developing countries. Market access considerations have also 
resulted in decisions by biotech companies to shelve new GM crops, like wheat or rice.  
More generally, export-related considerations are now progressively entering decision-making in 
an  increasing  number  of  countries.  The  multiplication  of  import  rejections  due  to  the  presence  of 
unapproved GM events in shipments is pushing exporting countries toward more caution. On the one 
hand,  in  view  of  the  huge  losses  incurred  to  non-adopting  producers  in  past  cases  of  accidental 
commingling  (e.g.,  LL601  rice), considering  export risk  before  release appears  to  be  a justified  and 
welcome decision. On the other hand, the management of market risk needs to be done rationally in a 
case-by-case basis. Precautionary measures based on hypothetical  or irrational risks  are bound to be 
detrimental to consumers and producers (e.g. potatoes in South Africa).  
While export concerns appear to increasingly matter, there has also been a gradual shift in power 
between exporters and importers in the last few years. For most of the last decade, exporters had to adapt 
to market requirements on GM food and had no word to say. But the increasingly rapid pipeline of new 
GM products has made regulations challenging for importers, especially those with zero percent tolerance  
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levels. In these countries, buyers are starting to call for changes of regulation, towards more practical and 
less precautionary measures, something that had never happened before.  
Ultimately, the future global welfare effects of GM crops will depend on the evolution of trade 
related regulations. The most important challenge of regulators will remain to ensure that new GM food 
products are safe for consumers in any importing country. The second challenge will be to manage export 
risks  associated  with  new  GM  events  in  an  increasingly  complex  international  regulatory  system. 
Harmonization in risk assessment and management procedures would greatly facilitate tackling these two 
challenges. On the other hand, the use of non-safety related information regulations, including mandatory 
labeling, should be assigned a lower priority, and such regulations are only justified if they are supported 
by market and consumer preferences. Whether countries can address these three issues successfully will 
depend on their capacity to integrate biosafety, markets, and political considerations constructively.  
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